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Sleep Deprivation and Advice 
Taking
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Nadira Sophie Faber5
Judgements and decisions in many political, economic or medical contexts are often made while sleep 
deprived. Furthermore, in such contexts individuals are required to integrate information provided 
by – more or less qualified – advisors. We asked if sleep deprivation affects advice taking. We conducted 
a 2 (sleep deprivation: yes vs. no) ×2 (competency of advisor: medium vs. high) experimental study 
to examine the effects of sleep deprivation on advice taking in an estimation task. We compared 
participants with one night of total sleep deprivation to participants with a night of regular sleep. 
Competency of advisor was manipulated within subjects. We found that sleep deprived participants 
show increased advice taking. An interaction of condition and competency of advisor and further 
post-hoc analyses revealed that this effect was more pronounced for the medium competency advisor 
compared to the high competency advisor. Furthermore, sleep deprived participants benefited more 
from an advisor of high competency in terms of stronger improvement in judgmental accuracy than 
well-rested participants.
Last year’s overnight EU summits deciding on last-minute financial rescue packages for Greece give the impres-
sion that it is becoming a tradition to make important decisions under acute sleep deprivation (SD). Many polit-
ical and economic decision-makers have been faced with making judgments while suffering from insufficient 
sleep, even before SD had reached the status of a “public epidemic1”. At the same time, as in the case of EU 
summits, these judgments are typically not made in a social vacuum: decision makers are required to integrate a 
wealth of information provided by advisors such as experts, lobbyists, or consultants. Recently, we have argued 
that SD alters judgment and decision-making in social contexts, since it is very likely to have social effects beyond 
its effects on individual functioning2. While individual functioning and SD has received considerable attention 
in the psychological literature3, the social aspect has not. One important social aspect in judgment is the role of 
advice, and the study reported here is the first to examine about whether SD affects advice taking.
Sleep deprivation and judgment
It is well documented that even one night of total sleep deprivation detrimentally affects a broad range of judg-
ments and decisions4. This applies particularly to decision tasks that are low in complexity and high in monotony, 
as well as to more complex task environments5,6. The negative effects of SD on judgment and decision-making 
are likely to be rooted in SD’s negative effects on their underlying cognitive functions: a meta-analysis of studies 
examining cognitive effects of SD found that lack of sleep had a negative impact on accuracy and speed in diverse 
cognitive functions, with most robust effects for attention and working memory3.
One interesting question arises from these findings of performance deficits due to SD: To what extent are 
individuals aware of those deficits? This is particularly important with respect to the question of how we can 
utilize advice when being sleep deprived, since advice taking could help individuals to compensate for those defi-
cits. No study has ever examined the effects of SD on advice taking. However, there is some evidence that allows 
speculation about possible effects. Studies on the ability to self-monitor cognitive performance under SD found 
that performance declines were mirrored in confidence ratings7,8. This finding indicates that SD did not impair 
the metacognitive ability to accurately evaluate one’s own performance and cognitive ability. In general reduced 
self-confidence in turn has been found to increase advice taking9.
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Further suggestions on why and how SD may affect advice taking come from research showing that SD 
increases susceptibility to the influence of others10. SD has been shown to reduce self-regulatory control and it has 
been proposed that this effect might be mediated by impaired executive functions11–13. Reduced self-regulatory 
control in turn increases responsiveness to social influence, such as compliance, persuasion or conformity14. 
Hence, we argue that due to lower confidence and higher susceptibility to social influence, SD increases advice 
taking.
Judge Advisor Systems
Sniezek and Buckley15 introduced the Judge Advisor Systems (JAS) as an experimental paradigm to systematically 
study social influence related to consultation and advice taking. A JAS is an (often computer mediated) exper-
imental environment in which one person – the judge – has to make a judgment after receiving advice from a 
(typically non-present and unknown) advisor. JAS examine the degree to which the judge integrates or discounts 
the advice in his own judgments. Although the main focus of judge-advisor research lies on the effects of advice 
taking (particularly advice under-utilization, so-called egocentric discounting) on judgment accuracy and deci-
sional confidence16, a large – yet growing – body of empirical studies tested potential moderators of advice taking. 
For example, it has been shown that individuals are more receptive to good advice compared to bad advice17 and 
paid advice is used more than free advice, even if it is of the same quality18.
Recently, research also started to account for extraneous factors that could influence advice taking – that is, 
variables that are not an inherent element of the JAS or the decision making situation per se. For example, it has 
been found that experimentally induced anxiety prior to the judgmental task promotes advice taking. This effect 
was mediated by lowered self-esteem9. In a similar vein, incidental gratitude leads to more advice taking, whereas 
incidental anger results in decreased advice taking19. SD’s high prevalence in the working world, for example, in 
the medical context20,21, points to the possible benefits of a better understanding of how advice might counter 
some of SD’s negative effects.
The present study and hypotheses
The present study aims to test whether or not SD has an effect on advice taking. We employed a laboratory-based 
experimental JAS using a within-subject manipulation of advisor competency. SD was manipulated between sub-
jects, hence we compared a sleep deprived (24h) group of participants to a control group with a night of normal 
sleep. We predicted higher advice-taking in sleep deprived individuals compared to those with a normal night 
of sleep (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, in line with earlier research17, we predicted that advice from a highly com-
petent advisor is generally more relied upon than advice from a medium competent advisor (Hypothesis 2). In a 
more exploratory manner we will examine potential interactions of SD and advisor competency as well as effects 
of SD on judgment accuracy.
Materials and Methods
Participants and design. Ninety-six undergraduate students (32 male, 62 female, 2 n/a, mean age = 25.6 
years) were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions of a 2 (sleep deprivation: 24h without sleep vs. 
regular sleep) × 2 (competency of advisor: medium vs. high) mixed design, with the first factor varying between 
participants and the second within them. Sample size was determined by a statistical power analysis using GPower 
3.1.7. In our study we expected small to medium effects (f = 0.2) using Cohen’s criteria22. With an alpha = 0.05 
and power = 0.90, the projected sample size needed with this effect size is approximately N = 68 for the simplest 
between and within group comparisons. Thus, our proposed sample size of N = 96 will be more than adequate 
for the main objectives of this study and should also allow for expected attrition and for additional subgroup and 
mediation analysis. No data-collection stopping rule was applied and no analyses were run before data collection 
was completed. Individuals reporting working late hours regularly, chronic sleep problems or psychiatric illness 
were excluded from participation. The experiment was approved by the local ethics committee of the University 
of Hildesheim (Germany), and the study was carried out in accordance with the approved guidelines. Informed 
consent was obtained from all participants.
Procedure. Two days prior to each experimental session, participants were equipped with actigraphs 
(GT3X-BT Monitor®) and sleep diaries to check for adherence to the experimental protocol. Actigraphy is a 
method established in sleep medicine to monitor activity, rest and sleep cycles, using accelerometers attached to 
the wrist of the participants23. Since there is some evidence that chronotype might be related to the ability to cope 
with extended wakefulness24, making evening types less prone to negative effects of SD, we included a single-item 
self-report measure from the Munich Chronotype Questionnaire25 in the sleep diaries (seven-point Likert scale, 
0–6 “I consider myself as an: extreme morning type (0) – extreme evening type (6)”). Participants in the SD con-
dition were instructed to get up at 8 am the day before the experimental session, to stay awake until coming to 
the laboratory in the evening (i.e., no naps during the day), and to abstain from caffeine in any form. Participants 
arrived at the laboratory at 12 am and stayed awake all night. During the night, research assistants were present to 
ensure that nobody fell asleep. Compliance was further checked using actigraphy data. Following a standard pro-
cedure in SD research26, participants were allowed to spend the night at their own discretion, with watching mov-
ies, reading, or listening to music. During the night beverages and snacks were provided, but participants were 
not allowed to consume caffeine or any other stimulants. At 7am, participants were served breakfast (i.e., cereals, 
bread, fruit of their choice) and started their experimental tasks at 8am. Participants in the control condition were 
instructed to get up at 8am on the day of testing and to arrive at the laboratory immediately before starting their 
session at 10am. These participants were instructed to sleep normally during the two nights preceding the exper-
imental session, which was controlled by actigraphy. Although the small difference in timing of our experimental 
sessions might add some noise, it clearly seemed the lesser of two evils to us: control condition sessions could not 
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be scheduled earlier, to ensure that the participants’ sleep duration was not affected by the study (i.e., participants 
had to get up early). The SD condition sessions, on the other hand, could not be scheduled later, to make sure we 
induced 24 hours of SD, not more.
Eight to twelve individuals participated in each session. All participants gave written consent for participation 
and were fully debriefed after the experimental session. Participants were told that they could stop the experiment 
anytime (which nobody did). As monetary compensation, participants received €20 as a flat fee. In the SD condi-
tion, participants were paid an additional €60 for their willingness to stay awake all night.
Judge-advisor task. Participants were seated in front of computers that were arranged in separate cubicles 
to seclude them from the view of others. First, participants filled in a questionnaire on mental fatigue. The scale 
consisted of five items (e.g., “At the moment I am reacting slower than normal”) on a seven point Likert scale 
(0 = not at all; 6 = absolutely) and showed very good internal consistency (α = 0.92). Afterwards, participants 
completed 30 trials of a judge-advisor task. Participants were told that the task was a test of their ability to cor-
rectly estimate airline distances between pairs of European cities (e.g., Paris–Amsterdam, Dublin–Helsinki)27. 
Further, they were told that they would be allowed to use advice in form of recorded estimates by other partic-
ipants who had completed the task earlier (the advisors). On each trial, they should provide a first (initial) esti-
mate, after which they would receive advice. Participants were then asked to give a second (final) estimate for the 
pair of capital cities in the respective trial.
Two different advisors were used to operationalize the within-subject factor of advisor competency: one advi-
sor was of high, the other advisor of medium competency. Participants were told that 100 individuals completed 
all trials of the estimation task in an earlier experiment and that these individuals were ranked according to the 
accuracy of their estimates. A rank of 1 indicated that this person gave the most accurate estimates; a rank of 100 
indicated that the individual provided the least accurate estimates in that sample. Using a bogus random gener-
ator, participants drew two individuals from this pool of potential advisors and were told the rank of these two 
advisors. All participants first drew “Advisor A: rank 52” (medium competent) followed by “Advisor B: rank 7” 
(highly competent). (Note, however, that we did not use the labels “highly competent” and “medium competent” 
at any time during the task, in order to avoid biasing the participants.) The estimates of Advisor A deviated from 
the true flight distances by 55% (range: 51–60%), whereas the estimates of Advisor B deviated by 16% (range: 
10–19%). In 15 trials for each of the two advisors, participants received advice from Advisor A and Advisor B, 
respectively. In each trial, after their initial estimate participants were told which of the two advisors provided the 
advice. The advice was provided in a written form of the kind “Advisor A estimated 500 km”. Both advisors gave 
advice that sometimes underestimated and sometimes overestimated the true distances, with 47% being under-
estimations. Trials were presented in a random order.
Participants were asked to work as accurately as possible on the task. They worked in a self-paced manner, 
there was no external time limit for the overall task, and the 30 trials were presented in one block without any 
breaks. The judge-advisor task was programmed and presented using z-tree (Zurich Toolbox for Readymade 
Economic Experiments)28.
Data preprocessing. Advice taking. To quantify the degree to which participants integrated the advice into 
their final estimates, we employed a weight of advice (WOA) measure commonly used in advice taking research16. 
The WOA indicates the degree of use of advice and is defined as the absolute difference between the final estimate 
and the initial estimate as proportion of the absolute difference between the advice and the initial estimate.
WOA = | (final estimatexi - initial estimatexi) |/| (advicex - initial estimatexi) | with x referring to each city pair 
and i to each individual’s estimate. The WOA measure ranges from zero (indicating complete discounting of 
advice) to one (indicating that the final estimate is equal to the advice). For example, when the initial estimate is 
400 km (e.g. for the flight distance for Paris-Amsterdam), the advice is 500 km and the final judgment is 450 km, 
a 50% shift (WOA = 0.5) occurred. In other words, the judge weighted the advice to 50%.
Although WOA-values > 1 are possible in theory (when the final estimate overshoots the advice), this occurs 
only infrequently (in about 6% of the cases reported in the literature29). Since there is no reason to assume that 
the judge should weigh the advice to more than 100% (from a conceptual perspective, it could even be argued that 
this is impossible), we set all WOA-values > 1 to 1, as it is common practice in judge-advisor research29–31. Out of 
a total of 2880 (30 × 96) WOA-values, 236 (8%) were corrected accordingly. The corrected WOAs were used as 
indicators of advice-taking.
Accuracy of estimates. As an indicator of the accuracy of estimates, we calculated the mean absolute percent 
error (MAPE). This represents the deviation of the estimates from the true distance27. The MAPE-score is defined 
as the mean of | (estimatexi - true distancex)/true distancex | *100 with x referring to each city pair and i to each 
individual’s estimate. Hence, for each trial’s initial and final estimate, we calculated the absolute value of the dif-
ference between the estimate and true distance proportional to the true distance multiplied by 100. For example, 
if the estimate is 400 km for the flight distance for Paris-Amsterdam (true distance: 429 km) the MAPE-score is 
7, indicating a 7% deviation from the true distance. Then we calculated the means of the trials (overall for all 30 
trials; as well as for the 15 trials with the highly and the medium competent advisor, respectively). This was done 
for the initial and the final estimates.
For our study it was irrelevant whether the deviations from the true air-line distances were over- or underesti-
mations, so as a result we used absolute values. The lower boundary of the MAPE-scores was 0, with lower scores 
indicating higher accuracy. There was no given upper limit for MAPE-scores. The observed range of the MAPE 
for initial estimates was 0–98. The observed range for the MAPE of final estimates was 0–84.
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Results
Sleep before testing. To examine sleep duration in the control condition, we analyzed actigraphy data 
using a standard sleep scoring algorithm32 and validated it with sleep diary data. Participants in the control condi-
tion slept on average for 396 min (SD: 63.26; range = 282 – 545 min). For two participants in the control condition 
actigraphy data was missing. For those two participants we used the sleep diary data and included them in the 
analyses. None of the participants in the SD condition fell asleep.
Mental fatigue. The 46 participants in the SD condition reported higher mental fatigue (M = 4.33, 
SE = 0.17), compared to the 50 participants in the control condition (M = 1.73, SE = 0.16), t(94) = 11.32, 
p < 0.001, d = 2.32, 95% CI [− 3.05, − 2.14].
Advice taking. We used R33 and lme434 to perform a linear mixed effects analysis of the effects of advisor 
competence and sleep deprivation on the advice taking (WOA scores). In the final model, we entered advisor 
competence and sleep deprivation as fixed effects. As random effects we assumed random intercepts for subjects 
and trials, but we did not assume random slopes. We assumed a random intercept model, because deviations from 
the grand mean (i.e., WOA under different conditions) were of interest and we had no predictors on level 1, which 
would suggest random slopes. P values were obtained using the lmertest package35. The intercept in the baseline 
model represents the grand mean. Intercepts in the subsequent models always represent the mean of the reference 
category, which assumes a value of 0 for all entered predictors. Here this is the control condition for the predictor 
condition and the medium competent advisor for the predictor advisor competence.
First, we checked the intra-class correlation (ICC) for the baseline model. This model predicted WOA inter-
cept (the grand mean of WOA) with a random intercept for trial and subject. The ICC for the WOA for subject 
as a grouping factor for each participant was .14 due to random effects, suggesting a multi-level model as appro-
priate. The ICC is based on the variance of the random effects and the residual variance in model 0. The estimates 
and results for all models are depicted in Table 1.
To the baseline Model 0 we added the factor condition (control vs. SD) as fixed effect resulting in Model 1. 
Model 1 showed that introducing the factor condition significantly added to the prediction, χ2(1) = 9.73, 
p = 0.002.
Model 2 added the competency of the advisor as a fixed effect to model 1 and led to a decrease of variance for 
the random intercept of trial, since the advisor competence explained variance between trials. Model 2 yielded 
a significantly better fit than model 1, χ2(2) = 389.85, p < 0.001 and two main effects for condition and advisor 
competence.
Model 3 allowed for an interaction of condition and advisor competence and showed a significantly bet-
ter fit than model 2, χ2(1) = 6.70, p = 0.0097. In sum, our analyses supported Hypothesis 1, by revealing that 
participants in the SD condition adjusted their final estimates towards the advice to a higher degree, compared 
to participants in the control condition (43% vs. 34%). In line with Hypothesis 2, adjustment was stronger in 
the highly competent advisor trails compared to the medium competent advisor trails (50% vs. 28%). To dis-
entangle the interaction between condition and advisor competency, we calculated post-hoc simple effects. These 
analyses showed that the difference between SD condition and control condition was more pronounced in the 
medium competent advisor trials, compared to the highly competent advisor trials (medium competent advisor: 
MSD = 0.34, SESD = 0.03 vs. Mcontrol = 0.22, SEcontrol = 0.02, t(94) = 3.82, p < 0.001, d = 0.78, 95% CI [− 0.18, − 0.06]; 
highly competent advisor: MSD = 0.53, SESD = 0.02 vs. Mcontrol = 0.47, SEcontrol = 0.03, t(94) = 1.55, p = 0.124, 
d = 0.32, 95% CI [− 0.14, 0.02]) (see Fig. 1).
Chronotype was not related to advice taking. The self-reported chronotype did not correlate with WOA scores 
in neither in the SD condition, nor in the control condition (all ps > 0.3).
Accuracy of estimates. First, we tested to see whether SD affected the accuracy of the estimates (independ-
ent of advice taking), and so we examined whether SD had an effect on the MAPE-scores of initial estimates. 
Model Random effects Std.Dev Fixed effects Est. Std.Err. Df T p
0
Subject 0.14 Intercept 0.39 0.03 51.21 14.16 < 0.001
Trial 0.12
Residual 0.31
1
Subject 0.13 Intercept 0.34 0.03 70.51 11.29 < 0.001
Trial 0.12 Condition 0.09 0.03 94.03 3.12 0.002
Residual 0.31
2
Subject 0.13 Intercept 0.23 0.03 96.42 9.23 < 0.001
Trial 0.05 Condition 0.09 0.03 94.03 3.11 0.002
Residual 0.31 Advisor Competence 0.22 0.02 28.04 9.71 < 0.001
3
Subject 0.13 Intercept 0.22 0.03 106 8.46 < 0.001
Trial 0.05 Condition 0.12 0.03 125.6 3.85 < 0.001
Residual 0.31 Advisor Competence 0.25 0.03 43.1 9.86 < 0.001
Condition: Advisor Competence − 0.06 0.02 2741.2 − 2.59 0.0097
Table 1.  Results of mixed effect modeling for Weight of advice (WOA scores).
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This analysis revealed that the initial estimates of the participants in the SD condition were slightly less accurate 
(M = 51.74, SE = 2.45), compared to the initial estimates of the participants in the control condition (M = 45.51, 
SE = 2.42), t(94) = 1.8, p = 0.074, d = 0.35, 95% CI [− 0.13, .01].
To control for this baseline-difference for the following analyses regarding the effects of SD and competency 
of advisors on the accuracy of estimates, we calculated difference scores of MAPE-scores (ΔMAPE) of initial esti-
mates and MAPE-scores of final estimates. Negative ΔMAPE indicate an improvement in accuracy, with higher 
negative values indicating stronger improvements. Next, we checked the intra-class correlation (ICC) for the 
baseline model. This model predicted ΔMAPE intercept (the grand mean of ΔMAPE) with a random intercept 
for trial and subject. The ICC for the ΔMAPE for subject was only 0.02, indicating very little variation is explained 
by random effects, suggesting a multi-level model as superfluous. Hence, we decided to conduct an ANOVA with 
repeated measures. A linear mixed effects analysis yielded the same pattern of results. We conducted a 2 (sleep 
deprivation: yes vs. no) × 2 (competency of advisor: medium vs. high) ANOVA with repeated measures on the 
second factor and ΔMAPE as dependent variable.
This analysis revealed a main effect of competency of advisor, indicating that participants benefited more 
from the highly competent (M = − 23.43, SE = 1.61), compared to the medium competent advisor (M = − 6.46, 
SE = 1.2), F(1, 94) = 84.32, p < 0.001, η p2 = 0.473, 95% CI [− 0.21, − 0.13]. In contrast, we found no significant 
main effect of SD on accuracy change, F(1, 94) = 0.64, p = 0.426, η p2 = 0.007, 95% CI [− 2.55, 5.99]. We found a 
two-way interaction of competency of advisor and experimental condition, F(1, 94) = 8.21, p = 0.005, η p2 = 0.08. 
Disentangling the two-way interaction, we calculated the simple effects for trials with highly competent advisor 
and medium competent advisor with experimental condition as the independent variable. For the highly compe-
tent advisor trials, these analyses revealed a stronger improvement for the SD condition (M = − 26.94, SE = 2.32) 
compared to the control condition (M = − 19.92, SE = 2.23), t(94) = 2.18, p = 0.032, d = 0.44, 95% CI [0.01, 0.13]. 
In contrast, for the medium competent advisors, this comparison showed no statistical difference (SD condition: 
M = − 4.67, SE = 1.72 vs. control condition: M = − 8.25, SE = 1.65), t(94) = − 1.5, p = 0.138, d = 0.25, 95% CI 
[− 0.08, 01] (see Fig. 2).
A post-hoc test of judgmental accuracy of the final estimates (MAPE scores) in the highly competent advisor 
trials, showed no statistical difference between SD condition and control condition (MSD = 22.98, MESD = 1.38; 
Mcontrol = 23.57; SEcontrol = 1.51; t(94) = 0.29, p = 0.782, d = 0.06, 95% CI [− 3.61, 4.78]).
Mediation analysis. In an exploratory manner, we tested whether increased advice taking caused by SD 
resulted in increased improvements of judgment accuracy. Employing a bootstrapping procedure36 we tested an 
indirect effect of SD (independent variable) on ΔMAPE (dependent variable) via advice taking (mediator). As 
shown in Table 2, this analysis revealed an indirect effect: the 95%-bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval 
(based on 10,000 bootstrap samples) for the indirect effect (B = − 2.00) did not include zero [− 4.19, − 0.63].
Discussion
We found that one night of total SD increased advice taking in an estimation task, compared to a control condi-
tion with regular sleep. In light of previous research showing that SD-induced impairments in cognitive abilities 
go hand in hand with decreased confidence7, we interpret our finding such that increased advice taking might 
have served as a coping strategy. Moreover, previous research has found higher susceptibility to social influ-
ence in sleep deprived individuals, presumably as a result of exhausted self-control resources10. Applying this 
idea to our findings, sleep deprived participants might have been more receptive to advice due to impairments 
in self-regulatory abilities11. Interestingly, the effect of SD on advice taking was particularly pronounced when 
the advisor was of medium competency. This finding indicates a tendency of sleep deprived individuals to rely 
more on decisional support, even if it is only of moderate quality. At first sight, this might be due to difficulties of 
Figure 1. WOA-values by competency of advisor and experimental condition. Data presented as group 
means ± SEM. *p < 0.05.
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sleep deprived individuals to differentiate between high and low quality information4. However, our study was 
designed to test whether SD has an effect on advice taking when the competency of advisor is known. Hence, in 
our study participants received rather unambiguous information of the competency of the two advisors (their 
rank position in a sample of 100 participants). And in each trial, they received information about which of the 
two advisors provided advice for that respective trial. Therefore, difficulties in correctly identifying the quality of 
advice are unlikely to apply as an explanation. In contrast, increased utilization of even moderate quality advice 
might reflect deliberative decisions by sleep-deprived individuals to more strongly rely on others. In any case, it 
would also be interesting to see future studies that whether SD has an effect on the correct perception of quality 
and source of advice.
Our analyses of judgmental accuracy revealed that sleep deprived participants’ initial estimates were slightly 
less accurate than the initial estimates of their rested counterparts. This decline in accuracy is likely to be a result 
of SD-induced impairments in basic cognitive abilities6,24. At the same time, sleep deprived participants were 
able to redeem this negative effect on judgmental accuracy due to increased advice taking – at least if advice was 
provided by a highly competent advisor. Hence, the good news is that although SD typically impairs decision 
making4, sleep deprived individuals are more open to taking advice which might even allow them to catch up with 
well-rested decision makers. Referring back to our example of sleep deprived politicians, our study emphasizes 
the importance for them to have access to highly competent and reliable advisors in times of reduced sleep.
Limitations. Two limitations of our study have to be acknowledged. First, although the type of judge advisor 
systems used in our study – a quantitative estimation task, where judges received the estimations of unknown 
and non-present others – is very common in judge-advisor research17,19, there are drawbacks of this paradigm. 
It can be argued that merely presenting estimations by others is too broad an understanding of advice: It has 
been proposed that advice is information from others received in the form of an explicit recommendation or an 
opinion37. Therefore, it would be interesting to see if our findings replicate for decisional situations where advice 
is more directive. Bearing in mind the increased susceptibility to social influence in sleep deprived individuals10, 
Figure 2. Improvements in MAPE scores from initial to final estimates by experimental condition in the 
highly competent advisor and in the medium competent advisor trials. Negative values indicate stronger 
improvements. Data presented as group means ± SEM. *p < 0.05.
Predictor
Outcome
WOA-values (M) MAPE difference (DV)
B SE t B SE T
Experimental condition (IV) a 0.091 0.03 3.12** c − 1.72 2.15 − 0.8
c′ 0.28 2.17 0.13
WOA-values (M) b − 21.96 7.29 − 3.01**
Indirect − 2.00 0.92 − 2.19*
R2 = 0.095
F(2, 93) = 4.89
p = 0.01
Table 2.  Mediation model for the indirect effect of experimental condition on accuracy. Note. N = 96. 
Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. Experimental conditions are dummy-coded: 0 = control 
condition, 1 = SD condition. *p < 0.05 **p < 0.005.
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we predict that the effects found in our study would be even stronger for more directive advice. For similar rea-
sons, we hypothesize that with a physically present advisor the effects will be more pronounced: the presence of 
the advisor generates social pressure on the judge, by adding normative social influence (i.e., not ignoring advice 
so as to not insult the advisor) to the informational social influence38. Taking into consideration the rather small 
effect of SD on advice taking found in our study, creating conditions under which the effect of SD should be more 
pronounced (such as more directive advice from a physically present advisor) is definitely a fruitful avenue for 
future research. Particularly because such conditions would increase the ecological validity of experimental deci-
sion making situations and allow for better estimations of the real-life consequences of SD. We see our study as a 
starting point to investigate advice taking in the context of sleep deprivation. We therefore decided to employ a 
well-established paradigm of low complexity that allows for a clear-cut calculation of advice taking. We encourage 
future research to plough ahead using other more real-life judgmental tasks.
Second, our goal was to examine the basic effect of SD on advice taking. We did not employ measures to 
uncover potential underlying mechanisms, such as judgmental confidence or self-control strength. Because our 
study tapped new ground, and since this type of research is very labor-intense and costly, we felt it would be more 
adequate to start with a clear-cut test of the basic effect, rather than including additional measures that on their 
own are likely to affect performance on the task. Of course, we endorse future research that directly tests these 
possible causal paths for the effects of SD on increased advice taking.
Conclusions
The main finding of our study is that one night of total SD increases advice taking in a judgmental task – par-
ticularly when advice is of only medium quality. Our study provides new insights into the widely neglected social 
effects of SD, such as mutual decision making and susceptibility to social influences. Furthermore, our study 
highlights the importance of studying and understanding how everyday factors, like sleep deprivation can influ-
ence decision making in social contexts.
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